Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Administrative Services on the Review of General and Application Controls over the HRIS and Payroll Systems, May 10, 2004 through June 4, 2004 by unknown
 
OFFICE OF AUDITOR OF STATE 
STATE OF IOWA 
State Capitol Building 
Des Moines, Iowa 50319-0004 
Telephone (515) 281-5834      Facsimile (515) 242-6134 
David A. Vaudt, CPA 







 NEWS  RELEASE 
    Contact:  Andy Nielsen 
FOR RELEASE  ____________________July 27, 2005________________________________ 515/281-5834 
Auditor of State David A. Vaudt today released a report on the review of selected general and 
application controls over the State of Iowa, Human Resource Information System (HRIS) and 
payroll system for the period May 10, 2004 through June 4, 2004. 
Vaudt recommended the Department take steps to implement the security program 
(including risk and vulnerability assessments), develop and implement procedures to improve 
information system access controls, establish program test standards, maintain copies of system 
and application documentation off-site, update and test the contingency plan, and improve 
segregation of duties. 
A copy of the report is available for review at the Iowa Department of Administrative Services 
or in the Office of Auditor of State. 
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June 24, 2005 
 
To Mollie Anderson, Director of the  
Iowa Department of Administrative Services: 
In conjunction with our audit of the financial statements of the State of Iowa for the year 
ended June 30, 2004, we have conducted an information technology review of selected general 
and application controls of the Iowa Department of Administrative Services for the period May 10, 
2004 through June 4, 2004.  Our review focused on selected general and application controls of 
the Department’s Human Resource Information System (HRIS) and payroll system.  The review 
was more limited than would be necessary to give an opinion on internal control.  Accordingly we 
do not express an opinion on internal control or ensure all deficiencies in internal control are 
disclosed. 
In conducting our review, we became aware of certain aspects concerning information 
technology controls for which we believe corrective action is necessary.  As a result, we have 
developed recommendations which are reported on the following pages.  We believe you should be 
aware of these recommendations which pertain to the Department’s general and application 
controls over the HRIS and payroll systems.  These recommendations have been discussed with 
Department personnel and their responses to these recommendations are included in this report. 
This report, a public record by law, is intended solely for the information and use of the 
officials and employees of the Iowa Department of Administrative Services, citizens of the State of 
Iowa, and other parties to whom the Iowa Department of Administrative Services may report.  This 
report is not intended to be and should not be used by anyone other than these specified parties. 
We would like to acknowledge the many courtesies and assistance extended to us by 
personnel of the Iowa Department of Administrative Services during the course of our review.   
Should you have questions concerning any of the above matters, we shall be pleased to discuss 
them with you at your convenience.  Individuals who participated in our review of the HRIS and 
payroll systems are listed on page 11, and they are available to discuss these matters with you. 
 
  DAVID A. VAUDT, CPA  WARREN G. JENKINS, CPA 
  Auditor of State  Chief Deputy Auditor of State 
 
cc:  Honorable Thomas J. Vilsack, Governor 
  Michael L. Tramontina, Director, Department of Management 
  Dennis C. Prouty, Director, Legislative Services Agency Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Administrative Services 
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HRIS, and Payroll Systems General and Application Controls 
A.  Background 
The Human Resource Information System (HRIS) is the state-wide human resource system.  
The payroll system is the state-wide payroll system. 
The HRIS and payroll systems were supported by the Information Technology Department for 
the Departments of Revenue and Finance and Personnel prior to July 1, 2003. On July 1, 
2003 the Departments of Personnel, Information Technology, and the accounting function of 
the Department of Revenue and Finance were combined with the Department of General 
Services to form the new Department of Administrative Services (Department).  The new 
Department is organized into four enterprises, the State Accounting Enterprise, General 
Services Enterprise, Human Resources Enterprise and Information Technology Enterprise. 
Effective July 1, 2003, the Information Technology Enterprise maintains and supports the   
Payroll system for the State Accounting Enterprise and HRIS for the Human Resources 
Enterprise.  
B.  Scope and Methodology 
In conjunction with our audit of the financial statements of the State of Iowa, we reviewed 
selected general and application controls in place over the Human Resource Information 
System (HRIS) and payroll system for the period May 10, 2004 through June 4, 2004.   
Specifically, we reviewed the following general controls: security program, access controls, 
application software development and change controls, system software controls, segregation 
of duties and service continuity; and the following application controls: input, processing 
and output controls. We interviewed staff from the Department and we reviewed Department 
policies and procedures.  To assess the level of compliance with identified controls, we 
performed selected tests. 
We planned and performed our review to adequately assess those Department operations 
within the scope of our review.  We developed an understanding of the Department’s internal 
controls relevant to the operations included i n  t h e  s c o p e  o f  o u r  r e v i e w .   W e  b e l i e v e  o u r  
review provides a reasonable basis for our recommendations. 
We used a risk-based approach when selecting activities to be reviewed.  We focused our 
review efforts on those activities we identified through a preliminary survey as having the 
greatest probability for needing improvement.  Consequently, by design, we used our finite 
review resources to identify where and how improvements can be made.  Thus, we devoted 
little effort to reviewing operations that may be relatively efficient or effective.  As a result, we 
prepare our review reports on an “exception basis.”  This report, therefore, highlights those 
areas needing improvement and does not address activities that may be functioning 
properly. 
C.  Results of the Review 
As a result of our review, we found certain controls can be strengthened to further ensure the 
reliability of financial information.  Our recommendations, along with the Department’s 
responses, are listed in the remainder of this report. 
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General Controls 
(1) Security  Program – An entity wide program for security planning and management is the 
foundation of an entity’s security control and a reflection of senior management’s 
commitment to addressing security risks.  Such a program would establish a framework 
and continuing cycle of activity for assessing risk, developing and implementing effective 
security procedures, and monitoring the effectiveness of these procedures. Without a well 
designed program, security controls may be inadequate; responsibilities may be unclear, 
misunderstood, and improperly implemented; and controls may be inconsistently applied. 
Such conditions may lead to insufficient protection of sensitive or critical resources and 
disproportionately high expenditures for controls over low-risk resources. 
  An Electronic Enterprise Security Policy for the State of Iowa has been drafted but 
procedures have not been developed to implement the policy. 
 Recommendation – The Department should develop procedures and implement the 
Electronic Enterprise Security Policy. 
 Response – The Governor’s Cyber Security Task Force recommendation to create an 
Information Security Office (ISO) separate from the Information Technology Enterprise with 
responsibility across the executive branch has been adopted.  A Chief Information Security 
Officer (CISO) reporting directly to the Administrative Services Department Director has 
been hired.  The new ISO has updated the Enterprise Information Security Policy and is 
working with departments, divisions and offices to develop an effective security program 
and implementation plan. 
 Conclusion – Response accepted. 
(2) Risk  Assessments – A comprehensive high-level risk assessment should be the starting point 
for developing or modifying an entity’s security policies and program. Such assessments 
are important because they help make certain all threats and vulnerabilities are identified 
and considered, the greatest risks are identified, and appropriate decisions are made 
regarding which risks to accept and which to mitigate through security controls. 
  Risk assessments consider data sensitivity, the need for integrity and the range of risks an 
entity’s systems and data may be subjected to, including those risks posed by authorized 
internal and external users, as well as unauthorized outsiders who may try to “break into” 
the systems. 
  The State of Iowa Electronic Enterprise Security Policy establishes the requirement that each 
department perform an information system risk assessment at least every two years 
following the assessment methodology developed by the Information Security Office. 
  A risk assessment methodology has not yet been developed or made available to 
departments and formal risk assessments have not been conducted. 
 Recommendation – A risk assessment methodology should be developed and made available 
to departments. 
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Response – The CISO and ISO are working collaboratively with agencies to develop peer-
based risk and vulnerability assessment programs to assure effectiveness and 
sustainability.  In those cases where peer-assisted assessments are appropriate, 
significant cost savings are possible.  ISO staff has visited all agencies twice to discuss risk 
and needs as a pre-cursor to a formal analysis process and began discussions with the 
CIO Council Security Committee on development of an enterprise risk assessment tool.  All 
agencies are to have risk assessments completed by November 1, 2005. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
(3) Security  Officers – A security program generally consists of a core of personnel who are 
designated as security managers.  These personnel play a key role in developing, 
communicating and monitoring compliance with security policies and reporting those 
activities to senior management. 
The State of Iowa Electronic Enterprise Security Policy indicates Agency Security Officers 
should function as liaisons to the State Information Security Office. 
Security Officers have not been identified for all agencies or departments. 
Recommendation – The State Information Security Office should coordinate the identification 
and appointment of security officers for all agencies or departments. 
Response – When the new ISO was established, each department, division or office provided 
a single point of contact (POC).  The ISO worked through the POCs to communicate with 
the many different organizations while the office was being set up.  All agencies are now 
being asked to name a security officer and alternate security officer, however, some 
organizations are too small to have staff meeting the requirements.  The ISO is developing 
a communications plan adequate for security officers that will also provide appropriate 
information to non-security professionals.  In addition, the ISO has drafted a plan for a 
Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) to react quickly to adverse cyber 
security incidents.  The team will be led by the CISO and have representation from ITE, 
ICN, Homeland Security and Emergency Management and participating agencies on a 
rotating basis.  A key role of the CSIRT will be communication of critical information in the 
event of a cyber security emergency. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
(4)  Vulnerability Assessments – Internet–borne attacks targeting security vulnerabilities occur on 
a daily basis and can threaten assets and mission critical systems.  A proven way to 
reduce risks from attack is to proactively test systems and implement appropriate counter 
measures.  Vulnerability assessments are a valuable tool in this process and help in 
gauging the effectiveness of security measures. 
Vulnerability assessments have not been performed. 
Recommendation – The Department should establish procedures to ensure annual 
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Response – The recently-approved Enterprise Information Security Policy requires each 
agency to perform an annual vulnerability assessment.  However, many agencies do not 
have resources in this year’s budget to conduct vulnerability assessments and they already 
have the risk assessment requirement.  The CISO and ISO will work collaboratively with 
agencies to develop a peer-based vulnerability assessment program to assure effectiveness 
and sustainability.  In those cases where peer-assisted assessments are appropriate, 
significant cost savings are possible.  The ISO has set a target of all agencies to complete 
vulnerability assessments during FY06 and annually thereafter.  
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
 (5)  Access  to  Production  Programs – The establishment of controls over the modification of 
application software programs helps to ensure only authorized programs and modifications 
are implemented.  This is accomplished by instituting policies, procedures, and techniques 
that help make sure all programs and program modifications are properly authorized, 
tested and approved and that access to and distribution of programs is carefully 
controlled.  Without proper controls, there is a risk security features could be inadvertently 
or deliberately “turned off” or processing irregularities or malicious code could be 
introduced. 
Procedures have been established for the movement of programs into production, but the 
person modifying a program is not prevented from placing it back into production.  Also, 
live data can be run against programs outside of the production library. 
Recommendation – The Department should establish a build process for all production 
applications that does not permit unapproved code from being put into production. 
Response – There were several issues identified, and I have addressed them individually. 
•  Person modifying a program is not prevented from placing it back into production. 
Online programs (IDMS or CICS) are not put into production without the involvement 
of someone outside of applications development, usually from database team or 
Software Support.  All program changes are first loaded to the staging library before 
being moved to production.  For all program changes (online and batch), we review 
test results with the customer, usually DAS/HRE or DAS/SAE, and obtain their 
approval before putting the modified code into production. 
•  Live data can be run against programs outside of the production library. 
We create test files that are copies of the production data in order to test more 
effectively.  We do not do updates against batch production files in our testing.  For 
online HRIS changes, we do use the shadow database, which is a copy of the 
production database, to test changes. 
•  Establish a building process for all production applications that does not permit 
unapproved code from being put into production. 
With these systems to be transitioned from their current platforms to the I/3 system 
by the end of calendar year 2005, it seems more efficient to make sure appropriate 
procedures are in place for that platform. 
Conclusion – Responses acknowledged.  Current practices involve someone outside of 
applications development but do not appear to prevent a programmer from accessing the 
staging library. 
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(6)  Program Test Standards – A disciplined process for testing and approving new and modified 
programs prior to implementation is essential to make sure programs operate as intended 
and unauthorized changes are not introduced.  Authorized changes are to be written into 
the program code and tested in a disciplined manner.  Because testing is an interactive 
process generally performed at several levels, it is important the entity adhere to a formal 
set of procedures or standards for prioritizing, scheduling, testing and approving changes. 
System and program testing standards have not been formalized or approved for all levels of 
testing that define responsibilities for each party. 
Recommendation – The Department should formally adopt testing standards and identify at 
what levels testing is required. 
Response – Staff size has previously prevented the establishment of a dedicated test 
organization.  That is changing and the applications division is in the process of creating a 
test/quality assurance team.  This organization will establish appropriate testing 
standards and procedures for all platforms and applications. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
 (7)  Management Review – One technique used to ensure compliance with established policies 
and standards is for data center management and/or security administrators to 
periodically review production program changes to determine whether access and change 
control procedures have been followed. 
Production program changes are not periodically reviewed to determine if access and change 
controls have been followed. 
Recommendation – The Department should develop policies to ensure production program 
changes are periodically reviewed to determine if access and changes controls have been 
followed. 
Response – ITE management review and approve all change control requests prior to their 
implementation. 
Conclusion – Response acknowledged.  Periodic reviews after implementation help to ensure 
compliance with established procedures. 
 (8)  System Software Access – Controls over access to and modification of system software and 
system software utilities are essential in providing reasonable assurance operating system-
based security controls are not compromised.  Access to system software and sensitive 
software utilities is to be restricted to a very limited number of personnel whose job 
responsibilities require they have access and security software should be even more tightly 
controlled. 
A review of access rights to system software indicated: 
•  Two employees with RACF “Special” attribute had their password interval set to “No 
Interval”.  As a result, the system will not force them to change their password 
periodically. 
•  Twenty-three employees had access to the “Special” attribute in RACF.  Nineteen did 
not appear to require that level of access. Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Administrative Services 
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•  Two employees had two user ID’s that allowed them to access all data sets and system 
software.  This level of access is not necessarily needed for the employees’ second 
ID. 
•  Two employees with access to system software database utilities have changed job 
duties and no longer need this level of access. 
•  System programmers access capabilities are not periodically reviewed to ensure their 
access corresponds to current job duties. 
Recommendation – The Department should develop procedures to periodically review access 
to system software, system utilities and RACF attributes to ensure appropriate controls are 
maintained. 
Response – ITE agrees with this recommendation and has a program underway that is 
making numerous improvements.  Appropriate access to help desk personnel in resetting 
passwords has been reviewed.  ITE is in the process of evaluating a “self-service” tool for 
password resets.  The practice of sharing passwords has ended and this has improved our 
ability to track who performed any given task.  Our RACF Administrator attended formal 
training to better enable us to evaluate and improve settings that control security.  The 
training, Developing Effective RACF Administration Skills, was attended on 
September 15-19, 2003.  In addition, the DAS Security Office has taken a lead in drafting 
policy and procedures that control and define access to sensitive system utilities.   
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
(9)  Segregation of Duties – Work responsibilities should be segregated so one individual does 
not control all critical stages of a process.  For example, one computer programmer should 
not be allowed to independently write, test and approve program changes. Dividing duties 
among two or more individuals or groups diminishes the likelihood errors and wrongful 
acts will go undetected because the activities of one group or individual will serve as a 
check on the other. 
System design, application programming and quality assurance/testing are not performed 
by different individuals or groups.  These functions are performed by the assigned team. 
Recommendation – Duties should be segregated to the extent possible and policies outlining 
the responsibilities of groups and related individuals should be documented, 
communicated and enforced. 
Response – Due to the severe limitations on staffing levels, the appropriate separation of 
these duties has not been practical.  With the payroll system having been transitioned to 
the I/3 platform, and the HR system transition planned by the end of 2005, these issues 
should be addressed.  The I/3 platform was developed by a 3rd party vendor.  Some 
customization will be done by state staff in the I/3 group.  Systems programming will be 
done by the Infrastructure and Database groups and testing should be the responsibility of 
the new Test group.  Once the transition of the systems is complete, delineation of 
responsibilities will be done. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Administrative Services 
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(10) Off-site  Storage – Routinely copying data files and software and securely storing these files at 
a remote location are usually the most cost-effective actions an entity can take to mitigate 
service interruptions.  The Department has established procedures and maintains backup 
data sets at a separate off-site location, but copies of system and application 
documentation are not maintained at the off-site storage location. 
Recommendation – The Department should develop procedures to maintain copies of system 
and application documentation at the off-site storage location. 
Response – As the COOP/COG state planning effort is completed, copies of the planning 
materials will be stored at the state off site storage location and at the vendor location.  
Additionally, Networking Services monthly backups, a CD of all IP addresses and other 
necessary networking documentation is created on a monthly basis and stored both at the 
vendor location and at the off site storage location. 
Conclusion – Response accepted. 
 (11)  Contingency  Plan – Losing the capability to process, retrieve and protect information 
maintained electronically can significantly affect an entity’s ability to accomplish its 
mission.  A contingency plan would include:  (1) procedures to protect information 
resources and minimize the risk of unplanned interruptions and  (2) a plan to recover 
critical operations should interruptions occur.  The Department developed a contingency 
plan for data processing center recovery in the event of a disaster but this plan has not 
been formally adopted by senior program managers or tested and emergency processing 
priorities have not been documented. 
Recommendation – The Department should update, adopt, distribute and test a contingency 
plan. 
Response – ITE has gathered requirements to upgrade the offsite recovery location and is in 
the process of completing the renovation.  The Hoover data center mainframe and the offsite 
mainframe are now able to share Medicaid data back and forth in test.  Production is 
scheduled for July 1, 2005.  Servers are also housed at Hoover and some servers are now 
located at offsite locations.  Beginning July 1, 2005 the renovation will be complete and the 
server farm disaster recovery site will be fully operational. 




No recommendations were noted in our review of application controls for the Department’s 
HRIS and payroll systems. 
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Staff: 
Questions or requests for further assistance should be directed to: 
  Erwin L. Erickson, CPA, Director 
  Brian R. Brustkern, CPA, Senior Auditor II 
  Steven O. Fuqua, CPA, Senior Auditor 
  Andrew E. Nielsen, CPA, Deputy Auditor of State 
Other individuals who participated on this review include: 
  Elvir Alicic,  Staff Auditor 
  Jodi Simon, Staff Auditor   
  Cory A. Warmuth, CPA, Staff Auditor 
  
 